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by Ralph A. Luken*
Almost since its inception, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has been using analytical
techniques related totheconceptofbalancingbenefits andcosts. AsaresultoftheReaganAdministration's
Executive Order 12291, benefit-costanalysisisplayinganincreasingly importantroleintheEPAregulatory
process. Benefit-cost analysis has assisted in organizing information and improving cost estimates. It has
influenced the choice ofregulatory criteria and aided in the developing degrees of stringency for environ-
mental regulations. The usage ofbenefit-cost analysis is limited by interpretations ofportions ofthe Clean
AirAct and Clean WaterAct that restrict consideration ofcosts orestablish technology standards. Benefit
analysis is only as reliable as the underlying scientific data in the health effects area. Work by epide-
miologists on the relationships between pollutant exposures and adverse health effects will play a vital
role in EPA's ability to value in dollars the health improvements attributable to pollution control. EPA's
Office of Policy, Planning and Evaluation is currently conducting combined economic and epidemiology
research to develop methods and estimates of the health benefits of pollution control.
Almost since its inception, the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency has been using analytical techniques
related to the concept of balancing benefits and costs
(1). Intheearly 1970s, underthe NixonandFordadmin-
istration, technological and economic feasibility studies
became an integral part of EPA's regulatory process.
By the second half of the decade, under the Carter
administration, cost-effectiveness analyses were com-
mon, and risk-benefit assessments were incorporated in
a few regulatory programs (see Table 1).
While very valuable, these techniques provide only
limited assessments of the economic efficiency impli-
cations of regulatory options. Benefit-cost analysis is
the only technique that attempts to evaluate in com-
mensurate terms as many of the effects of regulations
as possible and to identify more efficient alternatives.l
In 1978, the Carter Administration took a major step
toward the benefit-cost analysis of regulatory actions
with Executive Order 12044 (2). It required agencies to
identify the potentialbenefits ofvarious regulatory pro-
posals and to document the rationale forchoosing a par-
ticular alternative.
In 1980 the Reagan Administration made explicit the
requirement for benefit-cost analysis with Executive
Order 12291 (3). Now a Regulatory Impact Analysis
(RIA) must include not only the potential benefits, but
also the net benefits of regulatory options. The execu-
tive order also expanded the Carter Administration's
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definitionofamajorregulationthatissubjecttoanRIA.
Lastly, and perhaps most controversially, it enhanced
the centralized review and oversight procedures ofthe
Office of Management and Budget.
Benefit-Cost Analysis Performs
Valuable Functions
As a result of Executive Order 12291, benefit-cost
analysis is playing an increasingly important role in the
EPA regulatory process. Its fourmajor influences have
been:
*Organizing scientific and economic information into
a consistent framework for evaluating regulations
*Improving the accuracy of cost estimations
*Determining what regulatory criteria decision mak-
ers use; and
*Indicating, where appropriate, changes inthe strin-
gency ofregulations.
Organizing Information Consistently
As with all explicit analytical frameworks, benefit-
cost analyses are introducing a new structure and ter-
minology into the regulatory process. As a result, reg-
ulatory proposals now integrate scientific and economic
information into a more consistent, comprehensive
framework that informs decision makers about the ex-
pected outcomes ofalternative regulatory proposals. A
comparison between the analysis prepared for the 1979
primary air quality standard for ozone (4), which pro-
tects health, and the anticipated analysis for the 1985R. A. LUKEN
revision of that standard (5,6) illustrates the changes
that are taking place. These changes are particularly
evident in the increasing availability ofinformation (see
Table 2).
For the 1979 standard, a risk estimate was prepared
based on a probability function derived from expert
opinion. In the 1985 rulemaking, risks to health will
most probably be based on a dose-response function
"synthesized" from several published studies as well as
from an analysis of the 1979 Health Interview Survey.
The 1979 estimate of exposure included only sensitive
individuals whereas it is currently planned that for the
1985 estimate, the RIA will utilize the total exposed
population. The 1979 effect estimate qualitatively de-
scribed adverse health effects, whereas it is currently
intended that the 1985 estimate in the RIA will docu-
ment many specific health endpoints, such as minor re-
stricted activity days. The 1979 analysis did not monetize,
health orothereffects measures, whereas itisintended,
the 1985 analysis in the RIA will. The 1979 analysis
showed only incremental physical differences among
three regulatory options, whereas the 1985 analysis in
the RIA is likely to present both incremental physical
and monetary changes for as many as six regulatory
options.
Similar changes are also evident in the analytical sup-
port for the upcoming revision of the secondary stan-
dard for ozone, which protects vegetation and materials
(see Table 2). For the 1979 rule, a risk estimate was
based on a dose-foliar damage function that required
additional assumptions to estimate changes in crop yield.
For the 1985 rule, crop damages will be based on dose-
yield functions estimated from three years of field ex-
periment data that EPA conducted. The 1979 estimate
of exposure was an approximation for 103 crops, whereas
the 1985 estimate will be county-specific estimates for
six major commercial crops. Both the 1979 and 1985
effect estimation will be the same, i.e., crop loss. How-
ever, the 1979 analysis used asimplebiologicalvaluation
approach (crop loss times market value ofcrop), whereas
the 1985 will use a model farm approach (incorporates
the effects of price changes on crop quantities and the
substitution ofozone-resistant crops). The 1979 analysis
provided only 1978total damage estimates, whereas the
1985 analysis will probably show incremental changes
at different ambient concentrations.
Improving Cost Estimates
Before using benefit-cost analysis, EPA's program
offices developed worst-case or highest-cost estimates.
In so doing, the Agency made sure that the parties
having to comply with a regulation would not accuse
EPA of underestimating the compliance costs. Today,
program offices are beginning to prepare more accurate
cost estimates to accompany benefits estimates.
One example of this change is the way EPA's air
program office re-estimated the costs of performance
standards for new sources of emissions of volatile or-
ganic compounds (7). It shifted from worst-case as-
sumptions to most-likely assumptions in preparing a
new cost estimate. Where the worst case assumed that
each process in a given plant would need a separate
control device, the new model plant analysis recognized
that emissions from several processes could be con-
trolled by a common control device. Once costs were re-
estimated, the average cost per ton of emissions re-
moved dropped from a high of $1315 under the worst
case to estimates ranging between $240 and $930, de-
pending upon the particular process. In addition, some
process costs fell much more than others. As a result,
some of the control requirements may be made more
stringent, while others may be relaxed. In short, rees-
timating the costs led to significantly different control
requirements.
Another example ofthis change is the anticipated re-
analysis of the cost ofthe recently proposed best avail-
abletechnology effluentguidelinesfortheorganicchem-
ical industry (8). At the time ofproposal, EPA estimated
the capital costs of compliance at $1.4 billion based on
1976 data. After proposal of the rule, EPA initiated a
new industry survey to obtain a more current cost es-
timate. Although the new study is not yet completed,
a review of organic chemical plants on the Lower Mis-
sissippi River suggests that the estimated costs of the
regulation are excessive because the substantial in-
vestments that industry has already made in pollution
Table 1. EPA uses several analytical techniques.
First used
Analytical techniques at EPA Major questions addressed Present use
Technological feasibility Early '70s Is technology available? Effluent guidelines
Economic feasibility Early '70s Are the price changes, job losses, and plant Economic impact studies
closings too severe?
Cost-effectiveness Mid-'70s Is the cost per ton ofpollutant removed too Air/water regulations
high compared with the costs of other
regulations?
Risk assessment Mid-'70s Is the individual risk too high? Hazardous air pollutants
Risk-benefit Mid-'70s Are the reductions in risk of exposure (individ- Pesticides
ual risk times exposure) worth the foregone
benefits (costs)?
Benefit-cost Late '70s Are the economic benefits of the health and Executive orders
welfare changes comparable to the costs? 12044/12291
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Table 2. Current ozone regulations have stronger scientific and economic support.
Estimation Estimation Estimation Monetization
Standard of Risk of exposure of effects of effects Increme damage
1979 Primary Probability function, Del- Only sensitive Qualitative None Three exposure levels
phi technique individuals description
1985 Primary Dose response Total population Health endpoints Valuation Six exposure levels
1979 Secondary, Dose-foliar damage 103 Crops Crop loss Biological valuation Current
vegetationa function
1985 Secondary, Dose-yield function 6 Major crops Crop loss Model farm approach Percentage change in
vegetationa air quality
aCommercial crops, forests, and ornamental plants.
control technology. If these results are representative
ofthe industry, the capital costs ofthe regulation may
be as low as 50% of the original estimate.
A third example ofthe change can be seen in EPA's
calculation of the cost of attaining a standard for am-
bientparticulate matter. The original cost ofcompliance
only considered the cost ofcontrolling excess emissions
at onefuture pointintime i.e. 1987. However, arecently
released costanalysisreflects thecontrolofexcess emis-
sions between 1987 and 1995 (9). Although limited data
prevented a multiyear estimate, the new cost of com-
pliance, higher than the original estimate, more nearly
matches the estimate ofthe benefits that will be accru-
ing between 1987 and 1995.
Influencing Choice of Regulatory Criteria
Benefit-cost analysis is slowly changing the criteria
EPA uses to set standards. In the recently proposed
rule for inorganic arsenic emissions from copper smelt-
ers, EPAuseditstraditionalapproach ofanalyzingcost-
effectiveness and economic impact (10). It proposed re-
quiring emission controls for existing smelters emitting
inorganic arsenic at a rate of 6.5 kg/hr or greater. Six
ofthe 14existingsmelterswouldhave toinstall acontrol
system for convertor operations at a combined annual
cost of $8.6 million. As a result, the highest level of
remaining individual risk would be 3.8 x 10-3, and 0.23
lives would be saved annually at a cost per life saved
of $37 million (see Table 3).
In the same regulatory package, EPA acknowledged
that its method for determining which sources must
apply the best available controltechnology might result
in a lack of additional controls on certain smelters that
could pose greater health risks than some ofthe smelt-
ers EPA proposes to regulate. Therefore, EPA asked
for comments on two alternatives for setting this
standard.
One basis that is being considered in determining
which sources to control is the population density around
the source. This approach introduces a benefit criterion
by considering total number ofindividuals exposed. EPA
would divide sources into high-density (10,000 people
or more living within 20 km of the source) and low-
density (fewer than 10,000 people) sources. EPA would
require control systems at high-density smelters with
inorganic arsenic emission rates greater than 25 kg/hr,
and at low density smelters with rates greater than 35
kg/hr. As a result, only three ofthe 14 smelters would
have to install a control system, and the combined an-
nual cost would be $3.4 million. EPA estimates that the
highest level of remaining individuals at risk would be
3.8 x 10-3, the same as with the traditional approach.
However, the cost per life saved would be only $15
million, and 0.22 lives would be saved annually.
The second alternative is even more consistent with
the benefit-cost criterion. The approach would distin-
guish between sources byjointly considering maximum
individual risk and population risk. Sources with emis-
sions resulting in unacceptable combinations ofindivid-
ual and population risks would be classified as high-risk
sources and subject to regulation. Conversely, sources
with acceptable combinations would be classified as low
risks and would not be subject to additional regulation.
Given a hypothetical unacceptable combination of in-
dividual and population risk described in the regulatory
package, five smelters would be classified as high-risk
sources and would have to install control systems at a
combined annual cost of $7.9 million. Under this ap-
proach, the highest level of remaining individual risk
would again be 3.8 x 10-3. However, 0.39 lives would
be saved annually at a cost per life saved of$20 million.
Table 3. Benefit analysis for inorganic arsenic provides additional criteria for regulatory decisions.
Number ofplants Annualized control Highest remaining in- Implicit cost life saved
Regulatory criteria regulated costs, $ dividual risk Lives saved $
Cost-effectiveness 6 8.6 x 106 3.8 x 10-3 0.23 37 x 106
Population density 3 3.4 x 106 3.8 x 10-3 0.22 15 x 106
Risks to individuals and total 5 7.9 x 106 3.8 x 10-3 0.39 20 x 106
population
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Table 4. Benefit-cost analysis is influencing EPA's regulatory
strategy.
1981 or earlier
Regulation position 1984 position
Proposed benzene Reduce emissions by Maintain current
standards for mal- 90% or more level of control
eic anhydride
plants, ethyl-ben-
zene/styrene
plants, and ben-
zene storage
vessels
Particulate matter Relax current stan- Lean toward
national ambient dard by 50% maintaining ex-
air quality isting standard
standard
Lead in gasoline Freeze lead in leaded Potentially reduce
gasoline lead in leaded
gasoline to 0.1
g/gal
Suggesting Degree of Stringency
The stringency of regulations involves not only the
degree ofcontrol but also the implementation date of a
regulation. Some examples ofhow the requirement for
more rigorous consideration of benefits and costs may
be influencing the stringency ofregulations are seen in
the proposal to withdraw several proposed benzene
standards, in the proposed standard for ambient par-
ticulate matter, and in the benefit-cost study of remov-
ing lead from gasoline (see Table 4).
In March 1984, EPA decided to withdraw earlier pro-
posed standards for maleic anhydride plants, ethylben-
zene/styrene plants, and benzene storage vessels (11).
Since the Agency proposed the standards for the three
source categories in 1980, the emission estimates have
declined significantly, resulting in reductions of esti-
mated before-control individual and population health
risks associated with each source category. For exam-
ple, for benzene storage facilities, the estimated max-
imum lifetime risk ofdying prematurely from cancer to
the most exposed individual has declined tenfold to 3.6
chances in 100,000. The expected cancer incidence for
all three source categories is only one case ofadult leu-
kemia every 13 years. Moreover, were EPA to issue
the proposed standards for these categories, it would
eliminate only one cancer every 30 years.
The maximum individual risk at any benzene source
before regulation is 10-4, and at the other two source
categories, 105. The number oflives saved by regulat-
ing these three source categories ranges from 0.005 to
0.015, and the cost per life saved ranges from $87 to
$215 million. EPA has determined thatthe risks to pub-
lichealth are small and that thereis nosignificant health
benefit from controlling these emissions. Consequently,
the three categories do not warrant regulatory concern
at the federal level.
A second example ofhow examining the benefits and
costs ofpotential regulatory options may be influencing
the stringency of regulations is the recently proposed
revision of the national ambient air standard for par-
ticulate matter. In 1982, the Clean Air Scientific Ad-
visory Committee and the air program office of EPA
supported a change in the form ofthe standard to con-
sider only small particles and a considerable reduction,
perhaps as much as 50%, in the stringency ofthe annual
and 24-hr primary (health) standards (12). However, by
1984, EPA officials had begun to reevaluate the strin-
gency issue in light of analyses produced by the staff.
Although the proposed revision of the standard is a
range (150-250 pug/m3) rather than a point estimate, the
Administrator stated that he favored a point estimate
in the lower portion of that range (13).
An important factor influencing the staffs opinion
about the need for retaining a stringent standard was
the quantitative analysis of the implications of alter-
native, proposed standards (9). Studies used in the an-
alysis suggested that adverse health effects might occur
below the range of the proposed standard.
Another example of how benefit-cost analysis is be-
ginning to affect the stringency of potential regulatory
options is the recently released study of reducing lead
in gasoline (14). The study's conclusions markedly differ
from the Agency's position in the late 1970s and its
initial inclination in early 1982 to slow down or reverse
the phasing out of lead in gasoline (15).
In the 1970s, EPA took several actions that it as-
sumed would restrict and eventually eliminate the ex-
posure of the general population-especially young
children-to airborne lead emissions from mobile
sources. These regulationswere alsoexpected toreduce
undue health and welfare damage from gaseous motor
vehicle pollutants. First, EPA required that cars, be-
ginning with model year 1975, meet tighter emission
limits for carbon monoxide, nitrogen oxides, and hy-
drocarbons; this usually required catalytic converters
and unleaded gasoline. Second, in several actions, EPA
mandated that the lead content of leaded gasoline be
phased down from over 2.0 g/gal to 1.1 g/gal. However,
the growing problem of the misuse of leaded fuels in
cars with catalytic converters has significantly slowed
progress toward reduced lead emissions and challenged
the assumption that leaded gasoline would soonbe elim-
inated because of the lack of demand. These factors,
plus the increasing recognition of serious helath effects
from even low lead levels and the identification of gas-
oline as the major source ofenvironmental exposure to
lead, all indicated a need for reevaluating the policies
of the late 1970s.
EPA's benefit-cost study of reduction of lead below
1.1 g/gal in gasoline has concluded that the benefits of
both the low-lead and all-unleaded options significantly
outweigh the costs (see Table 5). Eliminating or se-
verely limiting lead would increase manufacturing costs
by less than 1%, and eliminating lead altogether might
result in excessive valve wear in some trucks or older
cars. Meanwhile, maintenance costs for automobiles
would decrease, and public health and welfare would
improve. Even though some benefits and one cost cat-
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Table 5. Comparison of benefits and costs of lead reduction op-
tions in 1988; all values in millions of 1983 dollars.
Low-lead All
optiona unleadedb
Costs
Manufacturing costs $503 $691
Nonmonetized damage to
engines that need lead D
Total $503 $691 + D
Benefits
Maintenance benefits $660 $755
Environmental and health
benefits for conven-
tional pollutants
Reduced damage by
eliminating misfueling $404 $404
Nonmonetized health
benefitsc H1 HI
Environmental and health
benefits for lead
Reduced medical costs $41 $43
Reduced cognitive
damage $184 $193
Nonmonetized health
benefitsd H2 H3
Total $1289+H,+H2 $1395+HI+H3
Net benefits $786+HI+H2 $704+H +H3H-D
a'This option would make a low-leadgasoline (0.10 g lead/gal) avail-
able only for those few vehicles that require some lead. It assumes
no misfueling.
bA lead in gasoline would be banned by 1988.
'These include chronic health effects of ozone and CO, and any
effects ofreduced sulfate particulates.
dSince medical costs and cognitivedamage were onlymonetized for
children with high levels of lead in their blood (>30 ,ug/dL), H2 and
H3 represent other benefits for this group (pain, lost work time to
parents, etc.), aswellasallthebenefits (medical, cognitive, behavior,
etc.) for the lower-lead group (<30 ,ug/dL). H2 and H3 differ because
the numbers of children at risk under the two options differ.
egory were not monetized, the measured benefits ex-
ceeded the cost for both options under consideration.
Benefit-Cost Analysis Has Several
Limitations
Although benefit-cost analysis is playing essential roles
in the regulatory process, these roles are subject to
many limitations. Probably the largest stumbling block
to its broader use at EPA is legislation passed in the
early 1970s (16). At that time, the environment was so
degraded that legislators assumed that the benefits of
any environmental regulations would exceed the costs
ofbringing them about. As aresult, the Agency's inter-
pretation of the Clean Air Act and subsequent judicial
decisions have restricted consideration ofcosts, and thus
net benefits in setting ambient air quality standards.
And the Agency's interpretation of the Clean Water
Act established technology availability rather than eco-
nomic efficiency astheprimarybasis forsettingeffluent
guidelines and controlling municipal waste discharge.
Although ExecutiveOrder 12291 doesnothavetheforce
oflaw, it requires such analysis for major regulations.
Some environmental management areas that EPA
regulates are incompatible withthe requirements ofbe-
nefit-cost analysis. For example, in the area ofhazard-
ous waste, a basic scientific understanding ofthe causal
linkage amongpollutants, transport and exposure is not
yet available. Similarly, the relationship between toxic
pollutants released in effluent streams and ecosystem
productivity is not well understood. Benefit-cost ana-
lysis cannot be applied in these areas until research
provides better causal information.
In the health effects area, benefit analysis itself can
only be as reliable as the underlying scientific data.
When the scientific community cannot agree on meas-
ures of health effects, or in some cases provide only
qualitative measures, economists face a wider band of
uncertainty which reduces the efficiency ofthe benefits
analysis.
Even when the scientific community is in agreement
on dose-response estimates, benefit estimation tech-
niques maynotbe capableofprovidingappropriate will-
ingness-to-pay measures ofsignificant health and welfare
outcomes. There is currently no consensus within the
Agency on valuing changes in morbidity in spite of
agreement that it includes pain and suffering, medical
care services andlostproductivity. TheAgency'sguide-
lines for valuation recommend using foregone wages,
even though this value is not conceptually correct and
excludes values for distress and discomfort associated
withmorbiditychanges(17). NordotheAgency'sguide-
lines offer any practical guidance on how to measure
losses or gains in ecological outcomes.
Lastly, benefit analysis, which emphasizes economic
efficiency, usually does not account for important dis-
tributional effects associated with regulatory decisions.
Many people think that the Agency's mandates call for
eliminating high levels of individual risk, regardless of
the costs (18). Others think that an additional concern
ought to be reducing the risk to the total population at
a reasonable cost. The attempt to include both concepts
in the new basis for setting an inorganic arsenic stan-
dard for copper smelters shows the Agency has not
satisfactorily resolved this issue (10).
Epidemiology Can Strengthen
Benefit-Cost Analysis at EPA
Theworkofepidemiologists caneliminate ormitigate
some ofthese limitations. Benefit-cost analysis calls for
valuingin dollars the health improvements attributable
to pollution control. Economists cannot bridge the val-
uation gap between health effects and economic val-
uation in the benefits information chain unless the
previous gap-the relationship between pollutant ex-
posures and adverse health effects-has also been
bridged. By focusing on establishing dose-response re-
lationships between pollution and disease, the work of
epidemiologists and other health scientists can make
benefit-costanalysis more accurate and comprehensive.
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Typically, economists (and noneconomists) who have
acted as environmental epidemiologists have conducted
observational studies using cross-sectional data (19). The
data on pollutant exposure and health effects used in
these studies areusuallycollectedindependentlyofeach
other. For the purpose of analysis, therefore, the ex-
posure data must be matched temporally and spatially
with the health effects data. This matching exercise can
only provide a very crude indication ofindividuals' ex-
posures to pollutants. It is obviously a potential source
of misclassification or information bias in the analysis.
For chronic diseases that are thought to be related to
air pollution, exposure history-as opposed to a single
contemporaneous exposure measurement-is regarded
as being etiologically more relevant in explaining the
prevalence of disease.
In the hierarchy ofepidemiologic studies ofpollution-
induced diseases, statistically significant associations
obtained in cross-sectional, observational studies are
regarded as merely being suggestive ofhypotheses con-
cerning likely cause-effect relationships. Such hy-
potheses must be confirmed in retrospective or, better
yet, prospective studies that have better exposure
measurements.
Epidemiologists are particularly needed forresolving
uncertainties andinconsistencies indose-response func-
tions estimated from secondary data. Epidemiologists,
of course, have knowledge of clinical and experimental
studies that may verify or contradict the findings ofthe
observational studies. In addition, econometricians, with
guidance and interpretation from epidemiologists, may
use the results of clinical and experimental studies as
prior information in improving the precision ofthe sta-
tistical dose-response estimates.
Where there is some professional consensus on the
relationship between pollution and exposure health ef-
fects, as in the study on lead in gasoline (14), benefit
analysis is much more credible and is a more effective
component of the decision process. However, where
there is little professional consensus on the relationship
between pollutant exposure and health effects, as in the
case ofmany standards forhazardous airpollutants, the
benefit analysis is more uncertain and has less impact
in the decision process because it cannot identify, with
reasonable certainty, a likely range of values.
Another critical area where epidemiologists can play
a role is in assessing the medical and, hence, potential
economic significance of various health measures that
may be related to pollution. For benefit-cost analysis,
economists need to assign values to the health damages
from pollution. Epidemiologists have in many instances
measured the physiological effects ofpollution, such as
lung function, forced expiratory volume or forced vital
capacity. But these measures are not as readily eval-
uated in economic terns as are health outcomes that
have readilyidentifiablebehavioralramifications. These
outcomes include morbidity and lesser manifestations
ofbad health such as days ofrestricted activity. Econ-
omists need to know the relationship between human
behavior and air pollution exposure rather than lung
function effects and air pollution exposure.
Lastly, cooperative efforts between epidemiologists
and economists to gather and analyze data can help
economists prepare more accurate and credible meas-
ures ofindividuals' willingness-to-pay to avoid adverse
health effects. Inthese efforts, economists considertwo
approaches: cost ofillness and willingness-to-pay (20,21).
The former approach generates a lower bound estimate
ofhealth benefits because it excludes evaluation ofpain
and suffering and nonwork-related motives for protect-
ing human health. Economists use this approach be-
cause data, forexample wage rate and medical care cost
data, are readily available. The willingness-to-pay ap-
proach is more inclusive and generates amore complete
measure ofhealthbenefits. However, obtainingthe nec-
essary data to estimate willingness-to-pay is difficult.
EPA's Office of Policy, Planning and Evaluation is
currentlyconductinghealtheconometric researchunder
several cooperative agreements that involves collabo-
ration between economists and epidemiologists. The
principal goal ofthe research is to develop methods and
estimates ofthe health benefits ofpollution control that
arebased analyticallyand empiricallyonindividualpref-
erences for health. Following are examples of current
projects:
* Health Econometric Methods For Multimedia Pol-
lutants (National Bureau of Economic Research and
University of Pittsburgh). This research involves
the development and application ofmicroeconomic
models for evaluating the individual and household
impacts of environmental pollutants on health sta-
tus. To achieve this end, the project team is utiliz-
ing the concept of a health production function as
the basis for making and interpreting statistical
estimates ofrelationships betweenmultimedia(air,
drinking water, diet) pollutant exposures and
measures of health outcome.
* Health Econometric Methods For Air Pollution
(Rand Corporation). Theresearchobjectives ofthis
project are identical to the National Bureau-Pitts-
burgh effort, but the project scope is more nar-
rowly focused on the economic evaluation of the
adverse health effects of air pollution. In this in-
stance, the project team is conducting statistical
analyses of relationships between exposure to air
pollutants and several measures of health out-
comes, including the use of health care services,
sick-loss time and general health status.
* Economic Consequences ofBody Lead Burdens in
Children (University ofPittsburgh and University
of Wyoming). The primary objective of this re-
search is to develop and demonstrate methods for
evaluating the physiological and neuropsychologi-
cal benefits ofreducing children's exposures to en-
vironmental sources of lead. Because of lead's
potential for causing intellectual impairments in
children, the project team is utilizing a health pro-
duction function approach that accounts for the ad-
verse effects oflead on child health and educability
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and, in turn, the effects of educability on lifetime
earnings.
* The Use of Time Allocation Information in Expo-
sure Estimation and Economic Benefit Analysis
(University ofMaryland). The objective ofthis ex-
ploratory project isto design a epidemiological sur-
vey in which measurements ofpollutant exposure,
health outcome and economic responses to pollu-
tant-induced health outcomes are all collected
simultaneously.
As a result of these and other efforts, we hope that
epidemiologists will become increasingly aware of the
regulatory implications oftheir work. As a result, they
may find ways to modify their studies in order to make
them more compatible with the needs of economic be-
nefits analysis. EPA, for its part, will continue to en-
courage and support cooperative efforts between the
two professions.
The author thanks George Provenzano, Reed Johnson, and Brett
Snyder for their comments on this paper. Special thanks also go to
Michelle Smith.
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